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Abstract Based on a new perspective in coordinating with
the traditional ‘‘N-1’’ criteria and system risk, a real-time
electricity market model is presented, in which the system
risk is employed to model the system’s overall security level.
This new model is called the risk-based security-constrained
economic dispatch (RB-SCED). Relative to the security-
constrained economic dispatch (SCED) used in the power
industry today, the RB-SCED finds more secure and eco-
nomic operating conditions. It does this by obtaining solu-
tions that achieve a better balance between post-contingency
flows on individual branches and the overall system risk. The
method exploits the fact that, in a SCED solution, some post-
contingency branch flows which exceed their limits impose
little risk while other post-contingency branch flows which
are within their limits impose significant risk. The RB-SCED
softens constraints for the former and hardens constraints for
the latter, thus achieving simultaneous improvement in both
security and economy. In this work, the basic concept and the
mathematical formulation of the RB-SCED model are sys-
tematically described. Experimental results on a 9-bus sys-
tem and the ISO New England actual system have
demonstrated the advantages of RB-SCED over SCED.
Keywords Economic dispatch, Security-constrained
economic dispatch (SCED), Risk-based security-
constrained economic dispatch (RB-SCED), Contingency,
Power system
1 Introduction
Risk assessment (RA) has been widely used in other
industries, such as nuclear, aerospace, oil, food, public
health, information technology, and financial engineering. It
is an emerging new topic in power engineering. Although the
successful application of RA in other areas could provide
valuable experience for the implementation of risk-based
approach in power systems, the definition as well as the
meaning of risk is quite different. In fact, the risk assessment
has a wide-ranging content. Traditional popular RA meth-
ods, such as mean-variance, Value-at-Risk and real opera-
tion approaches have been used in business and finance
areas—this kind of risk approach primarily takes an angle
from the economic perspective. The intent of this paper,
however, is to discuss the models, methods and applications
of engineering risk in physical power systems. The major
difference between engineering risk and financial risk lies in
their sources of uncertainties. For example, the financial risk
is rooted from uncertainties of credit, investment and market
liquidity, etc., while the engineering risk comes from failures
of equipment, behaviors of persons and weather conditions,
etc. In addition, the engineering risk should be in accordance
with the physical law of power systems.
According to an IEEE standard [1] risk can be calcu-
lated as the product of the probability of a contingency
occurrence multiplied by the consequence of that contin-
gency. In real world, both the probability and the conse-
quence of an event occurrence are difficult to quantify.
Thus, the risk management (RM) method, whose purpose is
to identify, assess and prioritize risk, should be studied to
minimize, monitor and control the probability and/or
sequence of the unexpected events. There should be at least
three tasks for risk management in power systems:
1) Setting up standards or measures for quantifying the
risk.
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2) Determining the acceptable risk levels for power
system operation or planning.
3) Finding the effective mechanisms to reduce the risk.
The application of risk management in power systems is
motivated by a perceived increase in the frequency at
which power system operators are encountering high stress
in bulk transmission systems and the corresponding need to
improve security monitoring of these networks. Traditional
security assessment approach in power systems tries to
capture risk with rules like the so-called ‘‘N-1’’ security
criteria. Generally, the security-assessment method can be
divided into two groups: deterministic and probabilistic
approaches. The deterministic approach, i.e., the ‘‘N-1’’
security-based decision method, is a worse-scenario
approach that is, any normal state is acceptable, and the
other states are not acceptable. The weakness of the
approach is that it lacks a quantitative method to measure
the security level and distinguish between the states.
Consequently, rough rules of thumb are adopted in the
decision process. Most importantly, the lack of a security
level index disguises the fact that it is hard to distinguish
the alert state and the normal state, both of which the
equality and inequality constraints are satisfied and unex-
pected events may cause undesirable consequences. Thus,
the risk index is a good metric to distinguish the operating
conditions of different states, and quantify the likelihood
and/or severity of undesirable consequences.
The deterministic approach has been applied in the
industry for a long time [2–5]. In the deterministic
framework, the system security analysis is performed in
terms of the thermal loading of system elements [6],
voltage and frequency variations for both transient and
steady states [7]. The basic idea is that the system is able to
withstand a set of selected contingencies, which are sup-
posed to have a significant likelihood of occurrence.
Although the deterministic approach has well-served the
industry on supporting the economic and secure operation
of power system in the past decades, there has been a
tangible price to pay for applying it: the solution tends to
be conservative because it tends to focus on the most
severe events. Consequently, it may lead to such situations
that existing facilities cannot be fully explored (in opera-
tion), or system resources be overbuilt (in planning).
Another weakness of the deterministic approach is that
there is no index to measure the system security level, thus
it is difficult to integrate security into the economic deci-
sion-making process.
In the past few years, outage events of power systems
happened many times all around the world. According to [8],
the national cost of power interruptions in USA is about $80
billion annually. Some severe power outages have happened
recently. For example, the Northeast Blackout occurred on
August 14, 2003 in North America area affected an estimated
10 million people in Canada and 45 million people in eight
states of USA. On November 10, 2009, a power outage
occurred throughout much of Brazil and entirety of Paraguay
(for a short time) affected an estimated 60 million people.
These severe outages of power system incentives re-examined
the single-contingency criterion (‘‘N-1’’ principle) that has
served the industry for the past decades. The ‘‘N-1’’ criterion
cannot be sufficient to guarantee the system at a reasonable
security level. On the other hand, it is generally accepted that
implementing ‘‘N-2’’ or even higher ‘‘N-k’’ (k C 3) security
principle may cause excessive financial and computational
costs for utility companies. Consequently, one attractive and
applicable alternative adopts risk-based approach in the
planning and operations of power systems.
The probabilistic approach roots from the nature of prob-
abilistic behaviors in power systems. For example, the random
failure of power equipment is usually beyond the control of
system personnel; loads will always be uncertain and it is
impossible to forecast the load exactly precise. It is known that
the probabilistic methods have been used as powerful tools in
various kinds of decision-making process [9–17]. In [18–22],
the authors focus on developing risk indices, which consider
both the likelihood and the severity of events, to capture the
probabilistic nature of power systems. One of the most
attractive implementation of the proposed methodology is to
perform the on-line risk-based security assessment (RBSA)
[23–26]. Compared with traditional online security assess-
ment who always performs security assessment on a past
condition (i.e., the last state-estimation), the RBSA has the
feature that it performs security assessment under a near-
future condition. One significant advantage of this feature lies
in that the decision based information, from the assessment,
corresponds to the time frame in which the decision is effec-
tive [25]. Although the deterministic methods are still domi-
nated in the industry, there is consensus that using
probabilistic approach has a great potential to improve on
analysis and decision-making.
This paper introduces a new concept of dispatch
method, called the risk-based security-constrained eco-
nomic dispatch (RB-SCED), and explores its application in
power systems. The work is an extension of previous works
[27–33]. In the rest of this paper, we introduce the basic
concept and mathematical formulation of RB-SCED
model, and test the model in two systems to illustrate the
benefits of RB-SCED over SCED.
2 The need of risk-based approach under uncertainty
Risk is a measure of uncertainties. The main motivation
of risk-based approach lies in the fact that the power
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industry is increasingly facing more uncertainties, which
have brought challenges to the security of power systems.
On July 21, 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) issued Order 1000 which supports many
states in USA to focus upon the following three topics of
future power system: energy efficiency, demand response
and smart grid. All of them will increase the uncertainties
of the systems. Energy efficiency means using less energy
to provide the same service. Some activities suggested by
the International Energy Agency (IEA) to save energy,
such as ‘‘turning off the lights when not using it’’ and
‘‘using a power strip to turn off stand-by power in elec-
tronics and appliances [34],’’ will increase the uncertainty
on human usage of electricity. Demand response is a
mechanism to encourage customers reducing their elec-
tricity consumption in response to market prices. The
Independent System Operators (ISOs) may even execute
load shedding according to the demand side bidding price
when necessary. The uncertainties, from both customer
behaviors and demand side load forecasting, make the
operation of power system more complicated. The smart
grid has a broad range of contents. Although its definition
is various, the following characteristics are generally
accepted to form the future smart grid environment: higher
penetration of renewable generation resources, deployment
of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technol-
ogies including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs),
provision to consumers with timely information and con-
trol options, increased use of information technology to
improve reliability, security and efficiency of the electric
power grid. Obviously, the smart grid environment will
bring new challenges to the operation of power systems.
All these factors will force power utilities to operate and
plan the system closer to the limits, thus leading to more
stressed operation conditions.
The risk-based approach is an emerging new direction
that is studied and beginning to be used in power system
planning [35, 36] and maintenance [37, 38]. Most of
previous work focus on the Risk-based Security Assess-
ment (RBSA). Researches on the application of risk-based
approach for real-time operation are rare. The major
reasons are that the ‘‘N-1’’ principle applied in RBSA is
simple to implement and to understand, and our operating
paradigm and tools have not evolved to enable observa-
tion of its weakness. References [39, 40] proposed the
frameworks of risk-based approach application for power
grids, but did not provide details on how to realize it. A
risk-limiting dispatch under smart-grid environment was
proposed in [41]. Although it has provided models taking
into account the stochastic nature of renewable sources
and the demand response, it may have computational
issues to extend the model in real-world large-scale power
systems. Our work on RB-SCED is an early attempt to
prompt the application of risk-based approach on power
systems.
3 Basic concept of risk-based economic dispatch
In this section we will present the basic concept of
RBED, without exploring the details of formulations and
computational strategies. Firstly, we introduce the so-
called security diagram proposed in [28], as shown in
Figs. 1 (a) and (b). The information provided in these
figures is described as follows:
Security regions There are three regions: emergency
region, highly-stressed region and less-stressed region,
corresponding to the areas with red, yellow and white
colors, respectively. If only overload violations are con-
sidered, the less-stressed region refers to the circuit loading
less than 90% of the emergency rating; the highly-stressed
region corresponds to loadings less than 90% of the
emergency rating; the emergency region corresponds to





















(b) Security diagram for the solution to RBOPF
Fig. 1 Security diagram
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Probability sectors Supposing that for this particular
system, there are five post-contingencies: C1 to C5. Note
that the contingency set in an actual power system is very
large, and we may just list the contingencies that bring the
system to emergency or highly-stressed regions. The
angular spread of each sector is proportional to the con-
tingency probabilities. For example, C4 has the largest
probability among the five.
Severity circles The small circles L1, L2, L5, L8 and L9
represent circuits with post-contingency overload violation
or near-violation. In this system, some circuit numbers, such
as L3, L4, L6 and L7 are not listed in the figure because these
circuits will not cause highly-loaded conditions. The radial
distance from the center of the diagram to each small circle is
proportional to the extent (severity) of the violation. For
example, L1 in Fig. 1 (a) means that flow at circuit L1 is
97.5% of its emergency rating under contingency C4.
Figures 1(a) and (b) demonstrate the benefits of RBOPF
over SCOPF. In Fig. 1(a), all the post-contingency branch
flows will not exceed their contingency ratings, it shows
the requirement of the ‘‘N-1’’ principle. However, this is a
highly stressed system since some high-probability circles
are located close to the red zone. In contrast, the RBOPF in
Fig. 1(b) shows that the high-probability circles L1, L2 and
L9 move closer to the white zone, at the cost of moving
low-probability circles L5 and L8 closer to the red zone.
By this way, lower risk is achieved by decreasing severity
on high probability violations L1, L2 and L9 while
increasing severity of low probability violations L5 and L8.
Although one violation L5 exceeds its deterministic limit,
the overall system risk is lower.
4 RB-SCED model
4.1 Description of risk index
Risk is a probabilistic index defined to reflect the severity
of the system operation condition [27]. Commonly used
indices include overload, cascading overload, low voltage,
and voltage instability [30]. In the RB-SCED model, only the
risk of overload is considered in accordance with the current
real-time dispatch software in electricity market, where DC
model is used for base case. Define E0 as the system loading
condition in normal state and Ei (i = 1, 2,…, N) in contin-




PrðEi; tÞSevðEi; tÞ ð1Þ
where Pr(Ei, t) is the probability of state i at time t, and
Sev(Ei, t) is its severity at time t. A typical expression of
the severity function of overload for a single circuit is:
Sev ¼
10  ðPl;t=Plmax  0:9Þ; Plmax\Pl;t\ 0:9Plmax
0; 0:9Plmax\Pl;t\0:9Plmax





where Pl,t is the power flow of circuit l at time t, and Plmax
is its transmission limit. The severity function is shown in
Fig. 2.
The probability of contingency is computed using sta-
tistical measures. To obtain its probability, we need to
know the frequency of occurrence of the contingency in a
certain time interval. In this paper, we use the methods
proposed in [42] and [43] to obtain the probabilities of
contingency.
4.2 Formulations of SCED, RBED and RB-SCED




s:t: gkðxk; u0Þ ¼ 0; k ¼ 0; 1; . . .; NC






where f0 is the objective function, k is the state of the system
while k = 0 corresponding the normal state and k = 1, 2,…,
c corresponding to the post-contingency states, gk and hk are
the equality and inequality constraints, respectively, xk is the
state vector for the k-th configuration, u0 is the vector of the
control variables in the normal state, and hmaxk is the vector
of limit for inequality constraints at state k.


















Fig. 2 Severity function of circuit overload
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where Prk is the probability of occurrence for the k-th state,
Riskk(Prk, xk) is the corresponding risk computed by given
probability Prk and state xk, Riskmax is the limit of the
system security level. Note that the flow constraints for
individual circuits at post-contingency are not considered
in (4). Instead, it restrains overall security level of the
system.
The RB-SCED problem combines the above two models
together by introducing two coordination factors KC and




s:t: gkðxk; u0Þ ¼ 0; k ¼ 0; 1; . . .; NC
h0ðx0; u0Þ hmax0
hkðxk; u0ÞKC  hmaxk ; k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; NC
XNC
k¼1





The choice of KC and KR in (5) enables us to impose
control over a tradeoff between security and economics:
the higher the KC and KR are, the more economic and less
secure the system is; and also a tradeoff between system
risk and individual circuit overload: increasing KC may
decrease the security of individual circuit while
decreasing KR may increase the security of the system,
and vice versa. Three different operational models are
proposed for RB-SCED: highly secure model (HSM),
economic-secure model (ESM), and extra economic-
secure model (HEM), where KC is chosen as 1, 1.05
and 1.25, respectively.
By choosing proper KR and KC according to real-time
operation condition, the system can gain significantly eco-
nomic benefits as well as improve the long-term security
level. For example, one may choose the ‘‘high security’’
operation point, (KR, KC) = (0.6, 1), under conditions when
high system security is required, such as heavy load and
severe weather. Similarly, one may choose a ‘‘high econ-
omy’’ operation point, say (KR, KC) = (0.5, 1.2), if the
system stress is low. Although a certain degree of post-
contingency overloading is allowed, the using ‘‘high econ-
omy’’ mode is attractive because of the following three facts:
1) The probability of a contingency occurrence is very
low, e.g., the trip of a transmission line may happen
only several times during a year, but we have to
prevent it in SCOPF model for every hour.
2) Corrective actions can be taken to bring the system
back to the normal state, if a contingency occurs, thus
guaranting the system security.
3) The degree of post-contingency overloading can be
controlled by choosing appropriate KC.
5 Numerical results
Two representative numerical examples are presented
by the proposed approaches: the IEEE 9-bus test system
and the ISO New England real system.
5.1 The IEEE 9-bus test system
The diagram of the IEEE 9-bus test system is shown in
Fig. 3. All the line impedances are indicated in the diagram
with per unit values.
The loads at bus 5, 6, and 8 are 125 MW, 90 MW and
100 MW, respectively. For simplicity, we assume the
generators only provide one-segment bidding prices, which
are 20, 40 and 80 $/MWh for generator 1, 2 and 3,
respectively. The maximum economic outputs of these
generators are 150, 200 and 150 MW, respectively. The
parameters of the transmission lines and transformers,
including the impedances, resistances and MW limits are
shown in Table 1. Two ‘‘N-1’’ contingencies are consid-
ered, i.e., the outages of circuits 4-5 and 6-9. Assuming that
their outage probabilities are both 0.01 at certain time t,
thus the probability of normal state is 0.98.
It is assumed that this is a lossless network while the loss
is constant during the computation. The loss offset is -4.46
MW calculated against reference bus 1.
Firstly, we solve the SCED model of the system. The
cost is $11,377.8, and the risk value is 0.9, which is set as
the maximum risk Rmax. Then, the three different models
of RB-SCED, i.e., the HSM model (KC = 1, KR = 0.5),
the ESM model (KC = 1.05, KR = 0.75), and the HEM
model (KC = 1.20, KR = 0.5), are solved. The results are
shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 4 lists the circuits with
flow over 90% of their limits at both normal and post-








X45 = 0.085 X46 = 0.092
X69 = 0.17X57 = 0.161
X27 = 0.0625 X78 = 0.072 X89 = 0.1008
X39 = 0.0586
100 MW
125 MW 90 MW
G1
G2 G3
Fig. 3 The IEEE 9-bus test system
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The following are some discussions about the results:
1) Compared with SCED, RBED has less cost and fewer
risk, but may cause high overloads for post-contin-
gency states. For example, the flow on circuit 6-4 is
112.5% of its limit at contingency 1.
2) HSM of RB-SCED is the most secure model but with
the highest cost. Similar to SCED, it does not allow
overload for post-contingency states, but its risk is
only an half.
3) The cost of ESM model is close to SCED, but the risk
is only 50 %. It decreases the power flow of circuit 7-8
at normal state from 100% limit to 93.75% limit,
which permits relatively small post-contingency over-
loads (5%) of circuit 6-4 at contingency 1.
4) The results of the HEM model are the same to that of
RBED. This happens because RBED is a special case
to RB-SCED with KC being large enough. In this
example, when KC is greater than 1.125 the dispatch
result will not change.
5.2 ISO New England system
The proposed RB-SCED model was applied to the real-
time power system in ISO New England, which consists of
12,300 buses, 13,500 circuits and 1,136 contingencies. The
generator bidding data we used are from a winter day in
2009. Wind turbine units are not included since they do not
have bidding curves. The number of bidding units is almost
400.
The results presented here are tested by using MATLAB
R2010a and CPLEX 12.1, on a 3.16 GHz Intel Core 2 CPU
and 4 GB RAM PC. There are 802,150 decision variables
and 4,002,196 constraints in the RB-SCED problem. The
average time to solve this problem is 70 minutes. Table 5
compares the results between SCED and various cases of
RB-SCED. By setting KR equals to 0.5, we enforce the risk
level of risk-based economic dispatch be half to SCED.
The HSM case has higher operation cost nevertheless
higher security level. The ESM and HEM cases have lower
operating cost, but allows for a certain level of post-con-
tingency overload. Since the probability of a occurring
contingency is very low in real operation, they can bring
significant economic benefits to the system. In addition, the
post-contingency overload, whose level is controlled by
Table 1 Parameters of the IEEE 9-bus system
Circuit 1-4 2-7 9-3 5-4 6-4 7-5 9-6 7-8 8-9
Impedance (p.u.) 0.0576 0.0625 0.0586 0.085 0.092 0.161 0.17 0.072 0.1008
Resistance (p.u.) 0 0 0 0.01 0.017 0.032 0.039 0.0085 0.0119
MW limits (MW) 150 200 100 100 120 150 100 100 100
Table 2 Comparison of risk and cost for the IEEE 9-bus system
Constraint SCED RBED RB-SCED
HSM (KC = 1, KR = 0.5) ESM (KC = 1.05, KR = 0.5) HEM (KC = 1.20, KR = 0.5)
Risk 0.9 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Cost ($) 11,377.8 11,172.5 11,679.3 11,476.6 11,172.5
Table 3 Comparison of generator outputs
Option G1 (WM) G2 (WM) G3 (WM)
SCED 136.46 161.60 21.40
RBED 146.76 142.88 29.82
RB-SCED
HSM 136.46 154.83 28.17
ESM 143.06 148.14 28.26
HEM 146.76 142.88 29.82
Table 4 Circuits with flow over 90% limit
Option States of branch flow over 90% limit
SCED 100% limit, circuit 7-8 at normal state
100% limit, circuit 6-4 at contingency 1
RBED 92.81% limit, circuit 7-8 at normal state
112.5% limit, circuit 6-4 at contingency 1
RB-SCED
HSM 94.38% limit, circuit 7-8 at normal state
100% limit, circuit 6-4 at contingency 1
ESM 93.75% limit, circuit 7-8 at normal state
105% limit, circuit 6-4 at contingency 1
HEM 92.81% limit, circuit 7-8 at normal state
112.5% limit, circuit 6-4 at contingency 1
Risk-based security-constrained economic dispatch in power systems 147
123
KC, can be relieved by corrective actions during the dis-
patch. The application of RB-SCED in power systems is
promising.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, the concept and the model of risk-based
security-constrained economic dispatch (RB-SCED) are
described. The risk is modeled as a product of contingency
probability and overload severity. Compared with tradi-
tional SCED, the benefit of RB-SCED model lies in its
ability to improve the economic performance of a power
system while enhancing the system’s overall security level,
which has been demonstrated by testing in the IEEE 9-bus
system and the ISO New England actual power system.
The following topics may be of interest for future
research:
1) Testing the RB-SCED model on a real-world large-
scale power system.
2) Investigating how the objective function changes with
parameters KC and KR.
3) Developing a new locational marginal pricing (LMP)
mechanism in accordance with the RB-SCED model.
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